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Abstract - Along with the introduction of HTML5 a new data 
storage technique, Web Storage, has been added to browsers. 
This technique stores larger amounts of data for an extended 
period of time on a client system. This technology does not 
(as of this writing) have a fully implemented interface to 
support end user control. 
The authors interest is modeling the use of Web Storage to 
store illicit data.  The authors built a web application that 
would take a file, encrypt it, split it into multiple parts and 
distribute it to as many clients as possible.  At a later time, the 
system could then watch for return visits and retrieve data 
parts as clients interact with a host website. The recidivism 
rate of clients returning to the host website and the number of 
copies of each distributed part needed to achieve a reliable 
recovery rate of the entire file are under study. 




  Suppose a nefarious user has a file of incriminating 
material (credit card number, account number, 
username/password or Personally Identifiable Information, 
drug client list…) that the user does not want to be 
apprehended with but needs access to from time to time.  The 
users goal would be to store the file somewhere that can be 
reliably retrieved but does not reside locally (for very long) 
and is not usable or discernable for what it is if found where 
stored. 
 
The authors propose a solution – Web Storage or 
localStorage.  If the nefarious user has access to a domain 
(simple Internet Service Provider will suffice) they could hide 
parts of any incriminating file on various client systems 
without keeping a local copy that he/she might be caught with.  
At a later time, when the information is needed, the user could 
get the parts back from the clients and reconstitute the original 
data. 
 
To explore this scenario, the authors have split the experiment 
into 3 parts.  The first part (testing phase) of this study has 
been completed.  A web application was built that proves the 
hypothesis that localStorage can be used for such a purpose.  
The second part of this study is to install the application on a 
working production site and statistically determine how many 
copies of the parts need to be disseminated in order to ensure 
retrieval – both over the short term and long term (would there 
be a difference between trying to get the data back in 10 days 
versus 90 days?).  Phase 2 has been initiated and 67 days of 
data have been collected as of this writing and preliminary 
findings will be presented herein.  Potentially, the effects of 
the choice of the number of segments to divide the original 
file could be studied, but for now they are held constant.  The 
third part of the study will look at possible detection 
characteristics for this sort of behavior and the development of 
tools and techniques for defense. 
 
2 Problem Examined 
 The illicit users have the same needs for information 
management and security that the rest of the world has, if not 
greater. The needs can be broken into two classes.  The first 
class would be one shared by all digital users, Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability or CIA[1], and the second would be 
one that is not so common, evasion.  Each of these classes is 
addressed in the proposed solution. 
Confidentiality is the limiting of access to data to authorized 
or intended users.  The data in this case is encrypted and then 
segmented into many sections.  The sections are then 
separated, encrypted and dispersed to disassociated unaware 
clients.  If any piece or subset of the collection is discovered 
and reassembled it is unusable. 
Integrity is knowing if the data is trustworthy, or in this case, 
were all of the pieces retrieved and reassembled correctly?  In 
this proposed solution, the individual pieces have a checksum 
or digest calculated and appended to the end before delivery 
to the client systems.  Upon retrieval the checksum is 
recalculated and verified to ensure that the chunk of data has 
returned intact.  Once the pieces have been reassembled, the 
original message is decrypted.  A final checksum for the 
entire original message is verified assuring that the message 
has been retrieved intact. 
Availability is being able to access the data when and where 
needed.  In this situation, the concept of availability relates to 
the reliability of future access to the data.  This is currently 
being studied as phase two of this project. The trade off is 
speed of access for deniability or “it’s not on my drive!”  The 
file is available to the owner with an access time of hours, 
days or months depending on many factors.  The benefit is 
that the file is unavailable to anyone else.  
The last issue is evasion.  Evasion is an act of subterfuge, 
avoiding or eluding detection.  The idea here is to hide the 
data from an examination of the local system.  Once the 
pieces are distributed, the local system and web database can 
be forensically cleaned and all evidence of the data 
eradicated.   Even if it were suspected that the web clients 
might be involved, a moderately trafficked web site could 
have hundreds, thousands or even millions of individual 
clients to investigate.  Since the clients are not owned by the 
illicit user being investigated, possible jurisdiction problems 
arise investigating any potential involvement of the clients. 
 
3 HTML5 and Web Storage 
 With the advent of HTML5 and its subsequent adoption 
in all modern web browsers (to varying degrees[2]), 
programming for a browser based internet experience recently 
turned to the better.  HTML as a standard has been around 
since 1990 and was standardized as HTML 4 in 1997.  
HTML5 is still under development (as of November 2011) 
and is meant to subsume not only HTML4, but XHTML1 and 
DOM2 HTML (JavaScript) as well[3]. 
Some of the advantages of HTML5 (ubiquitous coding APIs, 
numerous new media types, embedded semantic meanings) 
while a boon to both developers and users alike, are outside 
the scope of this paper.  The area of the HTML5 
improvements that the authors are planning on exploiting is 
the advanced data storage, or Web Storage[4]. While Web 
Storage is not directly part of HTML5, it has been repeatedly 
attributed to being part of HTML5 enough that most sources 
currently attribute it to HTML5.  Many developers may think 
that Web Storage includes cookies, various browser 
dependent client side databases, as well as storage objects.  
However, by the specification, the term Web Storage is 
limited to the storage objects – specifically localStorage and 
sessionStorage. 
Since Web Storage includes both localStorage and 
sessionStorage, both needed to be considered. Upon a quick 
examination it was found that sessionStorage matched its 
name – it is storage that exists solely for a browser session 
(sessions expire when the browser is closed and the data 
automatically cleared).  Because sessionStorage is 
implemented effectively, it is of little use to the user for our 
purpose.  localStorage, on the other hand, works perfectly for 
what is needed.  From a developer’s point of view, 
localStorage is an associative array or hash – a name=value 
pair that can hold any textual content. 
To understand the need for a localStorage object, a little 
history is needed.  Since the inception of the HTTP protocol, 
it has been stateless and anonymous, so a mechanism had to 
be created to make the tracking of state possible.  The ‘HTTP 
State Management Mechanism’ proposal was created to fill 
this void[5]. The outcome of which is commonly known as 
cookies.  The cookie mechanism is a name value pair that is 
served up from the client to the server inside of the HTTP 
Request phase (based upon various criteria: path on the 
server, domain to be served to, protocol to be served up to – 
http or https). Cookies have been used in various ways 
through the history of the web, more often than not they are 
used to hold a session identifier or token. Server frameworks 
(.Net, PHP, JSP) often implement these identifiers but 
occasionally they are created by hand by the developer. 
Historically, cookies were the sole means web browsers had 
for long-term storage capabilities. They had limited length 
(4096 bytes) and a limited number could be written per 
domain (20) for a total of 81,920 bytes of storage space[4].  
Today, localStorage, as a storage mechanism, is limited to 
5Mb per origin (domain)[6], or 655,360 bytes of storage (8 
times larger).  If the browser manufacturers maintain the size 
of the specification (currently IE9 allows more - 10Mb per 
origin), the possibility of using various client’s hard drives for 
illicit storage becomes tempting. 
As often happens with newer technologies, they are 
implemented before they are fully tested. localStorage works 
flawlessly in the modern browsers, but the tools that the end 
user has to allow, view, update or delete them is very limited 
(see TABLE 1). Combining the amount of storage space with 
a lack of user control makes this an invisible attach vector for 
illicit users to exploit. At the time of this paper, there is no 
unified user interface for localStorage.  If a user wants to find 
out what is stored on their various browsers there is no easy 
way. An advanced user would have to visit the domain they 
are interested in and then run a bit of code to see if they had 
any localStorage recorded. 
for (i=0; i<localStorage.length; i++) {           
   key = localStorage.key(i);           
   pairs += "key:"+key+" value:"+localStorage.getItem(key);         
} 
console.log(pairs);    (1) 
 
Adding to the problem of knowing if your localStorage is 
being used, there is no clear way for a common or average 
user to turn it off. Additionally, once it is written it doesn’t 
have an easy affordance to remove or review the data.  As an 
example of how this can be confusing, for Firefox’s DOM 
Storage (Firefox’s moniker for Web Storage) can be cleared 
via the menus “Tools -> Clear Recent History -> Cookies” 
ONLY when the range is “Everything”[7].  
TABLE I.  BROWSER COMPARISONS 
Current 
Browsers 
Access to Web Storage 
Disable Storage Clear Storage Examine Storage 
Current 
Browsers 
Access to Web Storage 
Disable Storage Clear Storage Examine Storage 
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on exit”, click on 
“Delete”, check 
“Cookies” and 
click on “Delete” 
once more. 
can see being 






A more universal interface is needed.  While it might not be 
necessary to split localStorage out from other data storage 
capabilities, listing it under Cookies may not be intuitive for 
average users.  Also, the ability to clear stored data in a more 
chronologically granular way would be useful. 
4 Problem Exploited 
 To exploit this possible weakness, the authors devised a 
web application that would take any textual file, calculate and 
attach a checksum, encrypt it, split it into a some number of 
parts (26 in our testing), give each part an identifier (both for 
the part of the whole and an identifier for which file it came 
from), calculate a checksum for the part and append it to the 
string then re-encrypt it.  It was found that from this formula 
it was possible to hide the parts on different clients and on 
subsequent visits those parts could be retrieved and 
reconstituted into our original data.  Should a non-textual file 
be the target, a simple binary to text translation tools such as 
base64 or uuencode would suffice. 
4.1 Web Environment 
For the implementation of the web application, the authors 
chose the open source LAMP architecture for it’s ubiquitous 
nature.  LAMP is an acronym for Linux, Apache HTTP 
Server, MySQL database, and PHP server-side scripting 
environment. 
4.2 Web Software 
From a top-level view, the implementation of the application 
via web browsers consists of an interface to take a textual file 
and use the processed described above to split the file and 
insert the parts to a database. When the authors were ready to 
populate the parts to the visitors that come to our site, a small 
client-side script that communicates covertly (via AJAX - 
Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) with a server-side script. 
The result of the server-side script is stored in the client’s 
localStorage. Once the illicit user decides there are enough 
copies distributed for his purposes, he can wipe out his file, 
the database AND all traces of the information. 
Some time later, when it is decided it is time to reconstitute 
the data, a different client-side script is inserted that checks 
return visit clients for our data.  If any data was found, be it a 
piece that hadn’t gotten back yet or one already recorded, it 
was decrypted, the checksum checked and stored.  After a 
period of time, the entire file was retrieved. 
 For a deeper explanation, there are two sets of scripts that 
execute this process. One set is used to distribute the parts out 
to various clients and the other set is used to retrieve the data 
back. Each set has both a client and a server script used to 
access the database for storage or retrieval as is applicable.   
The first small client-side script (2) can be injected into any 
html page. It tests if localStorage is implemented on the 
particular browser. Next, if the browser doesn’t already have 
a piece of the text file from our domain, a jQuery AJAX call 
is triggered to the server for the part of the file that has been 
distributed to the fewest clients.  The part is then written to 
the browsers localStorage under a commonly used token 
name (we used ‘uid’) to help hide our data and intentions. 
if(window.localStorage) { 
   if(localStorage.getItem('uid')==null){ 
      $.getJSON('localStorageSet.php',function(data){ 
         localStorage.setItem("uid",data.uid); 
      }); 
   } 
}      (2) 
 
The localStorageSet.php file that the AJAX call is hitting 
goes into the database of encrypted parts, finds the part that 
has been copied to the least number of browsers and sends it 
back to the client to be injected into the localStorage with 
‘uid’.  While the script is doing this, it also updates the total 
disseminated count on the part that it just served up and logs 
the visit to the database. 
Once the authors are confident that a sufficiently large 
enough number of targets have been populated, the original 
nefarious file and the database table holding the parts were 
destroyed.  For the truly paranoid a forensic wipe of the drive 
and the user would be worry free of being searched. 
The second small client script (Algorithm 3) can be employed 
at a later date, when the data is to be reconstituted. For this, a 
jQuery AJAX call is employed to send the contents of the 
specific localStorage data back to the server. 
$.post(‘localStorageBack.php’,{ 
   d:localStorage.getItem(‘uid’) 
});      (3) 
 
The data this sends back to the server is decrypted, checksum 
is checked and split into our original encryption, part and file 
identification. The data is then populated in a database table 
by its part identifier and filename for future reference.  Once 
all of the parts are recovered, the entire file is reconstituted, 
decrypted to the original state and the checksum verified. 
5 Proof of Concept Testing Environment 
The laboratory proof of concept testing environment is simple 
and easily duplicated.  VMware Workstation 7.1.0 was the 
foundation for the test environment installed on a Lenovo 
T61p laptop with 6Gb of memory.  The target web server was 
a stock BackTrack5 virtual machine image[8].  Apache 
2.2.14, MySQL 14.14 and PHP 5.3.2 were used to support the 
testing environment on the server. 
5.1 Configuring the Web Server 
The server application used was the default install that came 
with BackTrack5.  The only addition to this was an 
installation of phpMyAdmin, an open source tool for simple 
database access (http://www.phpmyadmin.net/). Starting 
Apache and MySQL was all that was necessary (no 
specialized settings like .httaccess was needed). 
In the testing environment, there was no reason to hide what 
was being attempted – so therefore two separate html files, 
one to set the localStorage, setData.php and one to get the 
localStorage back, getData.php.  setData.php had the client-
side code that executed the AJAX call (Algorithm 2).  The 
AJAX call triggered the server side localStorageSet.php to get 
the least distributed part of the file and send it back in JSON 
(JavaScript Object Notation) format.   
getData.php had the client-side code that used AJAX to send 
the contents of the localStorage.getItem(‘uid’) (Algorithm 3).  
The server-side code this executed, localStorageBack.php, 
decrypts the data and checks the checksum.  If the checksum 
was accurate the data was stored. 
In both cases, localStorageSet.php and localStorageBack.php 
all calls were logged and recorded for future study. 
5.2 The client setup 
To emulate the Internet client population at large, additional 
virtual machines were employed.  For the initial test, a 
Windows XPpro base image was constructed with no service 
packs installed.  This was not a necessary insecurity but 
established a baseline.  A stock install of Firefox 4.0.1 was 
done with no add-ons.  No special configuration of Firefox 
was performed.  Two scripts were added to the C:\ directory 
of this initial configuration to aid in the automation of the test 
case: setData.bat and getData.bat. 
First, the scripts make sure that the browser is not still 
running by executing a taskkill.  This was necessary to ensure 
that localStorage was not preserved for only a single browser 
session.  By terminating Firefox the session was stopped.  
5.3 Assembling the masses 
Once the Windows XPpro client is prepared, it is shut down 
and only used as a master for cloning.  The algorithm requires 
at least 26 clients to hold all of the pieces of the message.  
The following scripts automated the process of construction 
utilizing VMware’s vmrun tool[9].  The tool can issue 
instructions to several of VMwares virtualization tools 
including Workstation.  The following script creates 26 
clones of the master Windows XPpro virtual machine. 





for /L %%i IN (101 1 126) do ( 
   %VMRUN% -T ws clone %SRCVM% 
%CLONE%%%i\WXP%%i.vmx linked 
   %VMRUN% -T ws start %CLONE%%%i\WXP%%i.vmx gui 
   timeout -T 60 /NOBREAK >NUL 
   %VMRUN% -T ws suspend %CLONE%%%i\WXP%%i.vmx hard 
)                                (4)      
 
Vmrun is utilized to instruct VMware Workstation to clone 
the base Windows XPpro virtual machine 26 times.  After 
starting the VM a delay of 60 seconds allows the client to 
fully boot before the client is suspended.  Suspending allows 
for a faster cycle time for client visits to the web site. 
5.4 Occupy localStorage 
The next phase of the test is to have each of the 26 Windows 
XPpro clients start a browser, surf to the web server, and run 
the code to cause data to be deposited in the client’s 
localStorage area.  It is important for the browser to be started 
and stopped to assure that localStorage has persistence 
beyond the current session.  The following scripts are run on 
the host of the virtual machines to first set or download the 
data chunk to the client and second to get or retrieve the 
chunk from the client. 
set VMRUN="C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware 
VIX\vmrun.exe" 
set CLONE=C:\LocalStorage\CLONES\WXP 
set FIREFOX="C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe" 
for /L %%i IN (101 1 126) do ( 
   %VMRUN% -T ws start %CLONE%%%i\WXP%%i.vmx 
   %VMRUN% -T ws -gu dgj -gp "ATest4LocalStorage!" 
runScriptInGuest %CLONE%%%i\WXP%%i.vmx -nowait "" 
"cmd.exe /k C:\setData.bat 
   timeout -T 60 /NOBREAK >NUL 
   %VMRUN% -T ws suspend %CLONE%%%i\WXP%%i.vmx hard 
)                              (5) 
 
The MakeGetVisits script differ from the MakeSetVisits 
script in (Algorithm 5) only in the target script that is run 
locally on the client system: getData.bat.  This structure is 
only necessary in this test environment to ensure that the 
browser is successfully started and stopped and that sufficient 
time is given to the client and browser to complete the 
operations.  Typically the setData.bat script is run first 
followed by the getData.bat script.  The set/get operation 
takes about an hour to complete.  The entire environment 
starting from making the clones to retrieving the data set 
takes about 2 hours.  The use of linked clones keeps the 
storage requirements down to under 40GB for entire 
environment. 
6 PHASE 2 - DATA 
6.1  Seeding 
After proving that the authors could hide and retrieve 
information in a client’s Web Storage in a controlled 
environment, our task was to discover what would happen in 
the wild.  Interesting questions surfaced, such as how many 
copies of our user encrypted and obfuscated parts are needed 
to disseminate in order to ensure recovery and feel confident 
that the parts could be retrieved intact after 5 days, 30 days, 
or even 1 year.  
In order to begin answering these questions, permission was 
obtained to use two of the author’s departmental web 
presences (http://www.ist.rit.edu and 
http://www.nssa.rit.edu).  To make the results of this testing 
more accurate, the decision was made to remove all visitors 
from the 129.21.0.0/16 domain (RIT’s domain).  This 
decision was made because most of the visitors to these sites 
from that domain are the universities’ lab machines that are 
forced to visit those sites on browser launch and are re-
imaged at startup.  Since the set data on the lab machines 
would be removed at startup and the machines visit these sites 
multiple times a day, using results from these machines 
would skew the results in an unfavorable way. 
6.2  Limits 
The testing and data collection phase went live on December 
17th,, 2011.  While the data setting and collecting is still 
ongoing, for this paper it was decided to cap the data analysis 
on February 22nd , 2012 – so the preliminary data in this paper 
is from 67 days.  While this may be a small data set, 
interesting trends are already being seen. 
6.3  Observations 
An observational study was run with input variables number 
of sets available and the number of days until retrieval. The 
sample size for this study was  - full sets of data 
seeded. The response was measured as the number of days 
until a full set was received. Figure 1 contains the plot of the 
response and the number of sets available. 
 
Figure 1.  Days until one complete set returned against the number of sets 
available. 
The vertical line on the plot occurs at 178 sets complete. This 
cut-off point was chosen since set 178 was the last set 
available for a total of 35 days. This is important because 
from the limited timeframe of our data collection, waiting 35 
days for retrieval was determined to be our upper limit.  As 
our data collection grows and ages, the authors look forward 
to seeing what the revisit rates will be for longer periods of 
time.  
From the plot, a relationship is apparent. The relationship 
seems to be a slow decay then level off as the number of sets 
increase. This relationship is anticipated since it is logical to 
expect to get a full set back faster with more sets available. 
There is also a set of points between 75 and 93 sets that seem 
to be an anomaly as compared to the rest of the data. These 
data points represent 5% of the overall data and seem to occur 
for responses larger than 25 days. 
Figure 2 contains the plot of the response and the number of 
days before retrieval. 
 
Figure 2.  Days until on complete set returned over the number of days 
before retrieval 
Based on Figure 2, overall there seems to be some sort of 
increasing relationship occurring. The same group of data 
points from Figure 1 does not seem to fit with the rest of the 
data on this plot as well. 
Table II includes the information on the rank correlations 
between the response and each input variable. 
TABLE II.  CORRELATION TABLE 
Input Variable Estimate p-value 
Sets Available -0.451 < 2.2E-16 
Days Until Retrieval 0.361 < 2.2E-16 
 
Based on the results in Table II, there is a significant 
correlation between the response and both inputs at the 
 level. From the estimates, the relationship between 
the response and the sets available seems to be decreasing and 
the relationship between the response and the days until 
retrieval is increasing. This matches what is in the figures 
above. 
6.4  Next Steps 
From here the authors would like to increase the size and age 
of the study to assess whether or not the anomaly data that we 
observed is repeatable and allow for the all of the sets to be 
available for an equal length of time. We would like to create 
a model that can be used to predict the response based on the 
inputs and run this study in an experimental setting with other 
variables such as different websites, different configurations 
on the break-up of the set, etc. 
6.5  Exclusions 
From the capped data (as of 2/22/12), a total of 10263 initial 
visit parts have been set, with 24873 re-visits.  Of the total 
35136 visits to our sites, 1825 (5.19%) either had Web 
Storage turned off or their browser was unable to implement 
it.  For these visits, the database tracked the User Agent to 
determine the reasons.  Some of the browsers were simply too 
old (Internet Explorer 7) or aren’t equipped to handle local 
storage (Opera Mini).  Of the 35136 total visits, 328 had 
browser versions that have Web Storage implemented, but 
had it turned off (0.933 %), while the remaining 1497 visits 
were by browsers or devices that were incapable of Web 
Storage. 
The authors postulate that the very low number of visitors 
who had disabled Web Storage (<1%) may be due to many 
factors, including the standard being new and unfamiliar or a 
less than standard confusing interface.  While this is an area 
that could use future study, it only adds to the viability of 
Web Storage as being a useful tool for our purposes. 
7 Phase 3 – Detection 
Once a greater data set has been accumulated, the authors are 
interested in studying the future application and usage of 
localStorage.  The goal is looking for possible ways of 
monitoring and controlling localStorage activity, and 
identifying potential misuse.  Intrusion Detection System 
tools such as Snort examine network traffic looking for digital 
signatures indicate that potential malicious activity is present.  
The development of signatures and other tools will be of 
primary interest during this phase. 
8 Preventative Measures 
The history of software interfaces is littered with examples of 
poorly designed and implemented user facing controls.  The 
current state of the different browser interfaces to control 
Web Storage is lacking to say the least.  The only 
preventative measure for not allowing something like this to 
happen on a client is to completely disable cookies.  It should 
be noted that on all modern browsers there are different levels 
of cookie blocking (1st-party and 3rd party). However, since 
most trust the site they are visiting and 1st-party is what is 
being used, this number is relatively small. The number of 
visitors blocking 1st-party cookies varies greatly from one site 
to the next.  Reports of 25% for sites about security and 1% 
for sites about general health are abundant.  To know for sure 
one would need to test for their specific kind of site.. It should 
also be noted that once a localStorage value has been set, 
turning off cookies will not remove it, just make it 
inaccessible. 
9 Conclusions 
The authors hope these findings motivate browser architects 
to realize what they are making possible with their 
implementations and web application developers to think 
about the attack vectors they are creating.  The need for a new 
storage capability in web browsers is not in question.  The 
need to have the storage be easy to use for both developers 
and users alike is not in question. Although it may be a good 
idea to often hide implementation details from users, not 
giving them simple and intuitive controls that provide the 
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